Milner and the mind of imperialism by van Helten, Jean-Jacques
MILNER AND TIiE MIND OF l3EERrBLISM 
Jean-Jacques van Eel ten 
Let me say at once that ... I attach far more 
importance to the general prosperity of the Transvaal, 
to the development of its industry and its agriculture, 
to making it a great country, the home of thousands of 
working British people, carrying on an ever-increasing 
trade with their fellow-workers over here. 
Milner, The Nation and the mire, 106. 
... to direct a steady outflow of men of British stock 
to the younger countries of the m i r e  must thus be a 
constant object of Imperial policy. Of greater 
importance still is the quality of the emigrants. And 
that depends upon the character of the nation from 
which they are drawn. Thus the consistent Imperialist 
is inevitably led to concern himself with those 
influences which affect the condition of the mass of 
our people here at home. He cannot help being a 
zealot for social improvement. 
ibid, xl. 
-
Capitalist development in Southern Africa, particularly in Kimberley and on the Rand, 
was very much the result of the penetration of British and foreign capital as well as 
the rapid p w t h  of commercial intexests. The continued expansion of the mining 
industry, with its huge amounts of initial capital outlay, p&icularI.y after 1893 
when the deep levels came into operation, depended upon the state of the capital 
markets of Europe: speculative booms in "kaffir" shares not only lined the pockets 
of investors but also provided new working capital, for little capital was raised by 
the issue of debentures. (1) 
'Phis meant, at the South African end, hat es often had to 
opera%e under constraints inherent in their financial structure; khort-term profit 
maximization was needed to create new working capital and pay out dividends, thus 
raising the companyls speculative appeal, enabling it to raise yet firther working 
capital by share issues. In addition, the Rand was a fast growing urban and 
industrial market, which attracted a wide variety of commercial intqzests and export- 
orientated industries, many of which had progressively been excluded by tariffs from 
some of the more remunerative industrialized European or North American markets. 
At the London end, however, the very ability of the various mining houses 
and holding companies to play the London stock market and raise working capital 
depended upon the state of the British economy and the predilections of portfolio 
holders. (2) This also applied to some of the British export-orientated industries 
with interests on the Rand, whose performance depended very much on their ability to 
raise working capital through new share issues, thus allowing them to manufactme new 
product-lines attuned to the needs of the market. 
The state of the British economy, however, was not robmt, particularly w i t h  
respect to trade and the manufacturing industry. The effects of the Great Depression 
had been the subject of a Roya3. Commission in 1896, but even so between 1883 and 1913 
the share of world trade in manufactured goods in British hands dropped from 37.1 per 
cent to 24.4 per cent, whereas Gemanyrs proportion rose from 17.3 per cent to 23 per 
cent, and America's from 3.4 per cent to 11 per cent. (3) Throughout the 1880s and 
1890s neither government nor industry were unaware of this trend; Chamberlain in 
particular made British trade and export performance the subject of yet another number 
of enquiries and commissions. (4) The national press, too, exploited the theme of 
Britain's relative economic decline to the full and more often than not Gemany was 
portrayed as both the country's main trading and, by implication, political rival. (5) 
As world industrialization proceeded at a high rate of some 3.8 per cent per 
i~nnum between 1870 and 1913, the rate of growth of British exports and trade was bound 
to be subject to pressure (the T/Y ratio of foreign trade as a percentage of National 
Income declined from 59.0 per cent in the 1880s to 55.8 in the 1890s). (6) 
It can be argued that this pressure, however, could have been diluted in a 
number of ways. Firstly, Britain could have developed new export categories &/or 
produced specialized and high-grade types of existing goods. This strategy req~Lred 
a high propensity to innovate and a resources-transfer from old established into new 
sectors, such as electrical engineering, at home. 
Secondly, industry could have attempted to improve competitive ability in 
existing trading goods by reducing costs. In the European markets, however, such a 
cost reduction would have been cancelled out by higher tariffs and in any case price 
competition was not the only form of competition, Indeed, in the case of the Rand 
market, marketing techniques, after-sales service and packing were regaxded by 
many agents as far more important than the doubted quality of British 
nanufactures. (7) 
The third solution to the challenge of industrialization abroad was to 
continue to produce the same goods in more or less the same W ' ,  but to redirect 
exports to new markets such as the Rand with the assistance of capital exports. 
Indeed, it is arguable that the declining relative importance of industrial markets 
in favour of an expansion of trade in certain primary producing markets over the 
period 1890-1914 helped to maintain the obsolescent structure of Britain's export- 
orientated industry and failed to provide opportunities for long-term growth, partly 
because the absence of rivalry from other exporters in these markets was only 
temporary and existed as long as world trade continued to grow. (8) The massive 
influx of German and American manufactured products to the Rand after 1895 
illustrated the volatile and unprotected nature of Britain1 s "new" markets. (g) 
The link between Britain's industrial performance between 1880 and 1914 and 
the kte and direction of British overseas capital investment is more than just a 
tenuous one. In Januaqy 1899 Rothschild advised Rhodes, who apparently had an excess 
cash fund of $2500,000, to invest in a whole host of lowtern, fixed return bonds and 
Consols, including the Ottoman 4% 1891 and the India rupees 1854-5. Rothschildls 
timely advice undoubtedly have reflected the general apprehension felt in 
financial circles about the state of affairs on the Rand, for he did not believe that 
any gold mining company was worth investing in; his recomenaations were, of course, 
"a list of what I should buy for a favoured client if he entrusted me with the 
investment . . . ". (10) 
In fact, Lord Rothschild, who was no mean speculator, echoed more than 
anything else a broad trend within British foreign portfolio investment. The rates 
of return on British overseas investment portfolios during the period 1880-1914 
averaged about 4 per cent, which is consistent with the description of the aggregate 
portfolio as bond-laden (usually railways or local government) and chosen to suit the 
tastes of both conservative rentiers and evidently, if Rothschild is to be believed, 
of speculators. Althow many domestic industrial equities generated higher average 
rates of return - though, of course, they were correspondingly riskier - investors 
generally preferred the decidedly less risky foreign portfolios. (11) 
That the risk preferences of British investors directly affected the 
performance of British industry is particularly noticeable when one considers that 
during periods when foreign investment was tempora.rily less remunerative, e.g. 1890-1 
and 1895-6, rentiers increased either their consumption, their holdings of money 
balances or their mortgage investments. (12) At no time was a slackening in overseas 
investment reflected in a corresponding upswing in domestic equity investments, which, 
after all, were the main means of access by companies to new working capital. Unable 
to increase their capital formation, British export industries could not develop new 
export lines or meet the varying demands of new markets. 
Finally, patterns of foreign investment also affected the structure and 
level of domestic demands. Foreign investment importantly affected the export sector 
and directly, or indirectly, large amounts of foreign lending were translated into 
extensive orders for exports. (13) However, as the main beneficiaries of increased 
demand for exports were generally well established industries, foreign investment 
reduced the incentive to diversify throw the creation of new lines of goods, because 
new lines usually depended on domestic markets for initial developments and marketing 
appeal. Generally speaking, the tendency for export production to be less diverse than 
production for domestic use was further reinforced by the concentration of, for example, 
engineering export markets in the less industrialized countries with their more 
rudimentary requirements, at least during the initial stages of their capital 
development. 
By reducing the level of demand for British engineering goods and by 
deflecting what demand there was away from new, market-orie~tated lines, British 
foreign investment thus depressed the profitability and retarded the expansion and 
diversification of domestic engineering firm relative to what might have been 
reached with more extensive domestic investment. The incoaplete structural 
deveiopment of Britain's engineering industries with regard to new lines is particularly 
noticeable when one considers the industryrs performance on the Witwatersrand market; 
by the early 1900s British companies, which had been unable to raise sufficient working 
capital to switch their production of rock drills based on the reciprocating piston 
l principle to axial-feed water drills, had lost their earlier near-monopoly to American 
manufacturers. (14) 
In other words, by the 1890s British capitalism was confronted by a 
structural crisis with a severe lack of capital foxmation at home compounded by a 
slack export performance even in the less industrialized markets, where, like in South 
Africa, a standard line of products was ac-tually being pushed out altogether by 
foreign competition. Continued domestic capital accumulation was jeopardized by the 
risk preferences of investors, who remained unenthusiastic about pouring funds into 
I domestic equities. (15) 
Both Chamberlain, as a Midlands industrialist, and Milner, as an economist, 
former secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer and a Chairma;n of the Board of 
Inland Revenue, were aware of at least some of the structural problems harqpering 
sustained economic growth. Chamberlain, in particular, recognized that if the 
industrialized markets of America and Europe were being progressively closed to 
British trade by the imposition of tariffs, then this trade would have to be directed 
towards the less industrialized formal, or informal, empire, where competition was 
slight and consumer demands less at variance with what British industry could, and 
would, produce. (16) 
I bve argued elsewhere that the desire to incorporate a burgeoning Rand 
market more firmly into the British commercial orbit was, at least, a contributary 
cause of the outbreak of the bglo-Boer conflict: n British adminLstration on the 
Rand would not only safeguard. the existence of a more open market for British 
manufacturers but would also guarantee long-term uninterrupted capital mcumuLation 
within the mining industry, which was largely dominated by British capital 
interests. (17) Indeed, it was argued that, with the establishment of British rule 
over the Rand, "costs per ton of ore milled would be reduced by 5/- to 6/- and the 
immediate effect of such an action would be a) to increase the total tonnage and 
gold value by reason of the addition of Main Reef ore, the grade of which in the past 
fell below the pay limit b) excess profits attributable 'to this cost reduction would 
be upwards of E350,000 .l9. In addition, the Rand would bring "some comfort in view 
of the uneasiness about the future of British tradeg1; the total Transvaal import;- 
export trade in 1899 was estimated at i230,000,000 per am~um &, in view of the 
exhortation that "the English people should spread themselves out and get elb~w-mom~~, 
the obvious implication was that this trade was at least potentially secure for 
British industry. (18) 
In 1900 Chamberlain expressed himself in a similar enthusiastic vein about 
the future of British trade in South Africa, when he inforned a meeting of the 
Imperial Institute that 
there will be great numbers going to develop not only 
the mineral resources of this country which have 
already been opened up, but those still pater 
resources which we how to exist. In every kid of 
business occupation - manufacturing, industrial, 
mining - there must of necessity be great development 
and this country will be drawn upon for the majority 
of those who will carry out that development . . . (19) 
Milner wholeheartedly agreed, and added that tkse Transvaal was "a magnificeat estate 
which has been woefully rnismamgd ... it requires lzo extraordinary stlatesmamship, it 
simply requires ordinary, decent government and a reasonable liberality in public 
finance". (20) Milnerl S optimism was mirrored in a f P m  of pubXfcations and 
reports by governmental commissions to South Africa. 
domestic trade reports such as the one publisl~ed in 1903 by the Board of Trade on 
- 
Both Morgan and the Board a f  Trade dwelt on 
ition, the noticeable lack of new ~ h i n e r y  
and products by British manufacturers and, more importantly, the fact that many 
British manufacturers refused to market proaucts attuned to the specific and w i e d  
needs of local consumers. (21) 
In Britain the national press was aware of the country's precarious 
economic position and proceeded to publish, throug%out the period 1900-4, numerous 
articlea on "Doomed British Shippingtt,"The Economic Decay of Great BritainT9 and, of 
course, "The Growth of Genwm Ikportsl1. (22) Ln so doing tlae press was instrumental 
in fostering the emergence of the ideology of "national efficiencyq1 which lambasted 
the relatively poor export and trading perfomances of Britain. 
At the same time, this 18eificiency11 ideology provided a framework within 
which notions about Imperialism and the need to "protect" the Ehpire a@nst unfair 
commercial competition as well as semi-scientific concepts about race superiority, 
strong administration (e.g. Milnerrs regime in South Africa after 1900), social 
reform, militaxism B la Wilhelmian Germany, and so on, could flourish. (23) 
Efficiency was also a kind of ideological response to the laissez-faire 
individualism which had been the hallmark of British capitalism for several decades. 
State interventionism in both the econolqy and social relations in the form of a 
redirection of productive capitalts markets, urban planning (Milnerts particular fad) 
or state pensions, became ideologically respectable among hard-pressed Midlands 
industrialists and certain sections of the ruling class. The methodical application 
of state intervention required a carefully structured administration, necessitating, 
in Milnert S words, "a prescient mind and resolute willll (24), but which would then be 
able su6cessfully to confront the generally acknowledged socio-economic crisis facbg 
the country. 
Within Britain the governmentts response to the crisis in productive capital 
was lack-lustre and led to a number of commissions on shipping, foreign competition, 
etc. (25) Within the context of the newly conquered South African colonies, however, 
Whitehallts response after 1900 was of an entirely different and radical nature. 
Cha.mberlaints most forceful attempt to drag British industry screaming and kicking 
into the twentieth century was by ensuring that Milner pushed several multi-million 
pound orders for the newly established Central South African Pdlways (CSAR) and the 
larrd settlement schemes via the Cmwn Agents in the direction of British industry. 
As "the purchases of the New Colonies ... will be exceptionally large, 
British manufacturers shall have preference, other things being equal, in the 
expenditure of funds1'. (26) Considerable sums of money were involved in these 
purchases; originally some £10 million had been earmarked for lldevelopment purposeslt 
in the Transvaal, which largely meant railwqrs,and altho- by 1904 this sum had been 
whittled down to £7 million - llprecious little" in Milnerts opinion (27) - the South 
African Mines, Industries and Commerce Journal did note, in 1903, that "large and 
important orders have recently been placed by the Crown Agents in England far rolling 
stock and rails for the CS&. Seventy-four locomotives ... are now in course of 
construction1'. (28) 
In fact, in order to ensure that the CSAIlls orders would only benefit British 
industry, Chamberlain informed both Milner and Sir Percy Girouard, initially the head of 
the CSAR, that only the Crown Agents andbir sub-agents in Birmingbm (sic) should be 
contacted. The Milner regime and the CSAR were lq& [lqy italics] to purchase goods 
fram local (i.e. South African) agents and store-keepers as all our experience is 
against an arrangement of this kind unless in exceptional circurn~tauces~~. (29) 
By 1903 both Chamberlain and Milner had become convinced that Tariff Reform 
would greatly assist British trade and industry and give it the apparently necessary 
protection and guaranteed markets against foreign competition. In May 1903 Milner 
told Chamberlain: "1 need hardly  ay that personally I. watch the struggle at home 
[over tariffs and preferential trade] with the deepest interest and, of comse, with 
the heartiest sympathy with the line you have taken . . ." (30) In fact, Milner promised 
to "push for a preference of 25 per cent in favour of products of the British Ehpire1' 
at the Bloemfontein Inter-Colonial Conference of early 1903. Altho- his policies on 
preference were strongly supported by the Rand and opposed only by "a few Cape Town 
and Port Elizabeth merchants of the mugwump varietyf1 (31), their reception in Great 
Britain was one "of apparent complete indifference . . . 'l. (32) 
With respect to the British explosives industry, however, both Chamberlain 
and Milner were slightly more successful. Prior to 1899 the mines had been obliged 
to purchase their explosives from the Nobel-owned Zuid Afrilaansche Fabriek voor 
Ontplofbare Stoffen (ZAEY)S) at highly inflated prices. (33) After the Boer War, the 
mining industry, anticipating correctly that, in the words of Georges Rouliot in 1902, 
the British administration would 'llead to a proper application of local lawst1 (34), 
successfully called for the immediate abolition of .the ZAFOS monopoly. In 1903 the 
mines were consuming some %750,000 worth of explosives per annum. As many companies 
were still developing their mines for pmduotion and did not operate aqy ancillary 
plant as yet, their main working costs were in the mine; this meant that for many 
mines, particdaxly those marginal low grade ore deep-levels opened up during the 
brief 1902 boom, the cost of explosives was a much higher proportion of their total 
working costs. (35) 
Having arbitrarily abolished the ZAFOS monopoly in 1901, however, Milner 
soon discovered that he could not really afford to alienate either Nobels or its 
emissary to South Africa, Lord Ribblesdale. (36) The Nobel Trust and its Glasgow 
subsidiary mamgpd to pressurize Chamberlain and Milner into keepixg its old ZMPOS 
Modderfontein works open "as a British-lrun concerulst at least until 1905, when De Beers1 
Cape Explosives Works finally managed to dislodge Mobels from its predominance over 
the Rand market. 
In spite of both Milnerls and Chamberlainls earnest attempts, British 
commercial and industrial interests did not move into the Transvaal at an accelerated 
rate after 1900. In April 1901 Milner strongly supported Sir David Barbourfs 
recommendation of the total abolition of all 7* per cent ad valorem duties on impods, 
which would undoubtedly have helped to make British imports more competitive. (37) 
Nevertheless, the strmctW problems confronting British industrial 
performance, with its low rate of capital formation and its inabilitx to exploit 
successfully varying market opportunities, defeated all attempts at official assistance 
even within the confines of the Rand market, where agents and engineers, if the South 
African Mines, Industries and Commerce Journal is to be believed, had a high propensity 
for purchasing British goods. (38) In lgOO British exports to South Africa comprised 
64.05 per cent of total imports (inflated because of the war), but by 1907 this 
percentage had declined to 56.75 per cent. In absolute terms, too, imports for the 
corresponding period had declined from £l4,778,017 to £14,331,654. In 1908 British 
imports into South Africa declined even further, to £13,313,289 or 56.19.per cent of 
total imports. (39) 
In L907 S. J. Truscott, in The Witwatersrand Gold Fields: Banket and Mining; 
Practice, noted that the vast majority of machine drills were either made by Ingersoll 
Sergeant, or the Rand Drill CO, both of New Pork, and. that the fPClimax't drill by 
R. Stephens, Sons, of Cornwall, was no longer as popular as before. (40) In fact, as 
early as 1903, the Goch Mine, clearly intent on profiting from the anticipated rise 
in production after the imminent arrival of Chinese labour, purchased the five largest 
boilers south of the equator from the Sachsische Maschinenfabrik, Chemnitz. (41) 
Later in the year, the South African Mines ... noted that "the outlook for electrical 
plant is as encouraging as that for almost an;y line of manufacture. The strongest 
bidder for the trade, however, is Germany . . . ". (42) Much of British industqts 
inability to re-establish its p=-war predominance over the Rand =ket was due not 
only to its insensitivity to market opportunities but also to the persistently 
sluggish and recession-ridden performance of the Transvaal economy throughout the 
period up till 1914. As late as 1912 Britain still accounted for only 58.03 per cent 
of all imports into South Africa and the Board of Trade Commissioner noted that growth- 
related imports of mining machinery, electrical wires and cables, iron a.nd steel piping, 
etc., were dominated by Gemany and America, with 17.99 per cent of total imports. (43) 
It is the indefiniteness of our aim which is at the 
root of our troubles. At present it is really quite 
difficult to SW what we are driving at with all this 
immense expenditure of money and energy . . . (44) 
Any possible tiindefinitenesstt in the clear pursuit of restructuring 
capitalist relations of production in the post-war Transvaal was quickly brushed 
aside by Milnerls administrative freneticism. His concern to frame his actions in 
accordance with a long-range and comprehensive objective aid his opposition to the 
traditional empiricism, which he stigmatized derisively as "drift", was firmly rooted 
in the Edwardian ideology of national efficiency as well as in his own experiences as 
an administrator in Egypt. (45) 
Milner had been the Egyptian Under-Secretary of State for Finance between 
1889 and 1892. Ln 1891, in a lengthy interview with The Scotsman, he pointed out 
enthusiastically that "the British administration had removed the whip, interrupted 
the bribe, controlled the water supply .lv Mindful, as ever, of the considerable 
economic benefits for Britain of Lord Cromerfs benign rule in Cairo, Milner quickly 
added that sftwo-thirds of Egypt's exports are taken to British ports. Nearly one- 
half of her imports are derived from British factories. agTicu9tural revival in 
Egypt means a larger and cheaper supply of cotton for the British market ..." (46) 
Undoubtedly Milner viewed the Transvaal of the 1900s as analogous to the Egypt of the 
1880s. Certainly Milnerls main apologist, Basil Worsfold, commented extensively on 
the many similarities between Egypt and the Transvaal and noted the need for strong 
administration in both countries. (47) 
Central to his resuscitation of the qqwoefully mismanaged estatett and any 
subsequent economic benefits accruing to Britain, however, was the development of the 
Transvaal gold mining industry. In early 1903 the mining industq was, once again, in 
the throes of a depression. of the mining houses had been left with a large 
number of newly opened deep-levels which were unworkable because of their low-grade 
properties. The share markets of London and the Continent were stkaffir"-weary and so 
such losses could not really be recouped through manipulation of the stock-market, 
though, of course, a sizeable reduction in working costs with the aid of the Milner 
regime might ease the most pressing production problems. 
Milner was only too pleased to assist the mines. As early as 1902 he had 
agreed not to make the new Gold Law retrospective and allowed the mining companies to 
deduct war costs from the next year's (1903) tax liabilities. Dwcing the same year, 
Patrick Duncan had. commented that "whatever stj.mulates the mining industry is an 
indirect benefit to the whole comunityn. (48) With this resounding aphorism in mind, 
Milner set out to assist in every way the mining industryts attempts to restructure 
its productive process along more cost-effective lines. Aware that "what water was 
to Egypt, unskilled labour was to the Transvaalqs (49), Milner vigorously supported 
the Chamber of Nines1 attempts to reduce African wages a3ld import Chinese labour. (50) 
Indeed, he cajoled the initially reluctant Colonial Office and lmbasted local 
opposition, claiming that Hindustrial development, irrigation, railways, etc., 
the loyalty of the Dutch all depended upon Chinese labour . . . (51) 
While some of the constraints under which the mining industry had to function 
during the period 1902-6 have been more extensively dealt with elsewhere (52), an 
additional and important constraint inherent in the financial s t m c h  of the mining 
houses made it imperative for capital to call upon -&the Miner regime in its attempts 
to effect cost minimization and control over its labous force. 
Prior to the Boer War, a great m a n y  of the gold mining conpanies were, in 
part, speculative ventures and additional working capital was largely raised by the 
continual issue of new shares. A considerable proporision of these shares, however, 
were vendor's shares held at, or below, par. In 1899, for example, out of £15,989,395 
worth of equities issued, a mere £6,085,081 was actually expended on new capital 
developments, while the remainder was held as immobile, speculative capital. 
As the market started moving "upwardst1, the vendors and insiders tended to 
release their shares, thus capitalizing further on their initial outlays. Moreover, 
the retention of this immobile share capital led to the creation of a highly leveraged 
capital structure, giving relatively meagre profits to the and large profits to 
the privileged few. It is not susprising therefore that Beit could inform Rhodes in 
1891 that "I rather invest in properties here [Rand] where I can make 15 to 20 per 
cent with money without the risks which are apparent in the diamond mining 
industry . . .". (53) 
During the kaffir boom of 1895-6 some £12,282,660 worth of capital raised 
externally was working capital, while a hefty £23,810,229 was speculative vendors' 
capital. (54) After 1902, following the untimely demise of the post-war boom, the 
mining companies found it increasingly difficult to float new ventures. (55) Indeed, 
there is evidence to suggest that the overall shortage of externally raised capital 
for much-needed further deep-level developments ad, of course, speculation persisted 
until at least 1906, when Lionel Phillips informed Selbome that "the cost of desirable 
improvements and extensions will, in most cases, have to be provided out of .the profits 
of the concern . . .". (56) 
In fact, a certain amount of additional working capital had, perforce, 
been raised internally within the industry; dming the period 1887-1900 some 
£4,906,392 or 34 per cent of available profits had been appropriated from revenue for 
reinvestment. After the war, however, as part of a broad statistical trend it can be 
discerned that between l9OO and, 1914 &17,941,824 worth of working capital. was raised 
internally, which, compared to a pre-was figure of £4,906,392, represented an increase 
of no less than (my italics). (57) 
This trend, which points to both an absolute and a percentage increase in 
internally raised working capital, undoubtedly had important repercussions for the 
mining industry. Post-war dividend papnents did not register a decrease, but the 
annual appropriation from revenue for reinvestment bid show this substantial increase, 
which meant that the mining industry was caught in a vice. On the one hand, the 
industry had to maintain a modicum of returns, if only to satisfy investors and 
stabilize the market. (58) On the other hand, their output had to be increased 
substantiaLly to cover both these returns and the enlarged amount of intermally mised 
working capital, for little new capital was raise6 externally. 0Kl.y an additional 
1.3 per cent, or £472,841. wosth of working capital, was raised externally after the 
war, compared to pre-war figums, 
Working costs had to be reduced, and JYiluaer~s efforts undoubtedly made a 
considerable imp&. A straightforward 10 per cent tax on mining profits, a more 
efficient and enlarged railway network, reduced tariffs, an increased ability to 
mite off depreciation of machinery against tax returns, etc., all helped to reduce 
the industryfs considerable overheads. !The mines' lmgest single cost component, 
however, was still labow,aYld the additional pressure to raise essential working 
capital internally resulted immediately in the mines atteqting to raise further output 
per unit of labour by, in the case of Chinese face-workers, piece-work. (59) Indeed, 
capital, with the aid of the Milnerite reglsle, had generally to incmase coercion at 
the point of production in order to raise output, hence Milner's ac~uiescingi~ the 
flogging of Chinese labourers in the compounds. (60) 
While both Chamberlain and Milner showed a remaskable lack of landerstanding 
of the workings and stxucture of the mining industry and failed %o appreciate the 
critical problems which shortages of working capital immediately raised, the latter 
was aware that cost dnimization could be effected partly br a reduction in both the 
costs of imported mnclnineqr and the overall cost of living. (61) In fact, both these 
objectives, Milner noted, could partially be achieved by a reliable railway 
network. (62) The British administration had set up the CSAR and the railway budget 
forned the largest single item of the Guaranteed Loan of 835,000,000. Some ~10,000,000 
was to be spent on the "new developmentll of the two former republics,and of the latter 
swn one-half was assigned to the construction of the new railway lines. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, Milner could enthuse, in 19Q3, that "we have £5 millions to 
spend between the Orange and the Zimpopo. The question is how best to spend it? What 
lines are needed most?" (63) Quickly pre-empting any Uns~licited answers to his 
rhetorical questions, Milner ensured that the Bloemfontein Railway Extension Conference 
unanimously decided that yet another coal line along the Rand had to be constructed, at 
a cost of £740,000. Moreover, Miner also pushed through the building of the 
£956,000 "Grain Line" from Bloemfontein to Johannesburg. 
Any reservations Ckmnberlain might have had about this scheme, which 
d d  benefit the Band as well as the OFS and Cape farmers, were resolutely brushed 
aside by the High Commissioner, for "the lines themselves are greatly wanted ... to 
promote the economic development of the count~y". (64) 
Central to Milnerrs attempts at assisting the mining industry and 
strengthening the "British element1' was his creation of an administration from which 
directives on the reconstruction of -the Transvaal were supposed to emamate. A strong 
administration with clear policy objectives was equally linked to the ideology of 
Hefficiencylf a@ well as to notions of Imperialism - as NiLner once remarked, l1this 
country [~ngland] is a country rich in  men who have an instinct for governing backward 
races. As long as our Public Schools turn out such Men we shall not be under preasme 
to give up our Empire ..." (65) 
At first he had attempted to attract Uitlmders to his new Transvaal 
administration, but after a number of gaffes he decided to play it safe and return to 
culling his administrators from the ranks of the Oxford Qlite. (66) Accordingly, in 
1902, Milner drew up an exhaustive list of potential Transvaal administrators: 
without exception they were "rowing men who felt that their salary was immateridll, 
like James Watt and Edward Grogan, the latter a Dalliol man recommended by Patrick 
IJuncan despite his "bad degreev. (67) His penchant for Oxford-educated administrakors 
was, of course, not unusual other than that, once in South Africa, the proliferation 
of these administrators led to the emergence of the "Kindergartenl'mythology. (68) 
Throug%out the early 1900s numerous magazine and newspaper articles, as well 
as speeches by politicians such as Lord Rosebery and Asg,uith, publicly bemoaned the 
wide variety of ills that had apparently 'befallen Britain; Germany aJnd America were 
stronger economically, and the physical health of the British race had been painfully 
exposed by the high rate of infant mortality and the poor recruitment figures during 
the Boer War. (69) Gne comprehensive answer to a number of these seemingly 
insurmountable problems lay in a properly governed country free from squabbling 
politicians and. run by efficient administrators. A policy of "national. efficiencyg1 
was called for and its main advocate was Amold White, whose book, Efficiency and 
Ehpire,had a tremendous impact on early Edwardian ideology. (70) Indeed, in lgOB, 
the Daily Mail even editorialized that it would only support Parliamentary candidates 
who '%best fulfilled the demands of the great principle - Efficiencyw. (71) 
Milner and his ailministration in the Transvaal were soon viewed as the 
embodiment of this efficiency principle: "what the Empire needs now ... is a man, if 
possible, who has thought, who has seen and who knows, a man with an iron will." (72) 
Milner, with his experience as a bureaucrat in Cairo, regarded &upire and 
administration as complementary, if not synonymous, and his beliefs blended in 
naturally with those of the efficiency ideologues, whose considerable social and 
political impact was enhanced by adherents such as Sidney znd Beatrice Webb, 
H. G. Wells, Grey, Rosebery, Lyttleton Gel1 and George Bernard Shaw. (73) 
The empire played a fundamental ideological role; it would enable Britain 
to withstand foreign competition by providing the country with secure "natural9' 
markets. Tariff Reform was, in part, an inevitable offshoot of efficiency. In 
addition, the empire would halt the continued physical degeneracy of the British rase 
by allowing emisation to the healthier climes of the Antipodes or South Africa, (74) 
The Kindergarten and Milner showed how, like in Egypt, an efficient British 
administration, free from the shackles of party politics, could attempt to transform 
a country overnight; the Kindergarten graduates were applauded, for "the aristocracy 
is nothing more than the most efficient people in the nation", . Indeed, "the upper 
classes11, Arnold White noted, "are fundamentally sound1\ (75) Milner, who 
consistently kept in close touch with developments in Englauld, was quickly enveloped 
by the enthusi.asm for efficiency and informed Lady Edward Cecil in 1903 that the 
Cabinet was "unwieldy" and that administrative responsibility should be gmded 
efficiently so that vital Imperial issues would not become mixed up parish pump issues 
such as "a row in the Guardsf'. (7'6) In fact, as early as 1900 Kilner had been 
involved with Lyttleton Gel1 am3 Birchenou& in setting up the Administrative Reform 
Association with the aid of the editor of , Sir James 
Knowles. (77) 
Milner also felt that "Joe might have to give way to the pressure of 
parliamentary necessities, of Party and of a rotten public opinionf1. (78) His 
contempt for party politics was quickly picked up by some members of the efficiency 
cult: Lord Rosebery mused about ''putting the British Empire on a business 
footing" (791, while Philip Lyttleton Gel1 wrote to Milner in 1904, in the aftermath 
of the Russo-Japanese conflict which had gseatly excited the efficiency i&eologues (80), 
that 
I shall turn Japanese for they at least can think and 
act and be reticent. I fail to see any Western people 
in a position to set the Japs an exaple in their 
diplomacy, their strategy, their virile qualities, 
their devotion and their self-control. Above all, 
their national capacity for self-reliant self-sacrifice 
ajnd their silence [sic] . . . (81) 
Milner undoubtedly concurred, and during the same year he returned to the 
themes of reticence, devotion and control, in a letter to P. H. Coqgdon, the Secretary 
of the Imperial Federalist Association. IvBa-t was needed, he claimed, both in 
Britain and South Africa was "a powerful body of men, and it wouLd hare to be very 
powerful, determined at all times ... to work regardless of any other consideration, 
against the man or the party who played ... with the cause of National Unity. I shall 
always do that . . . (82) 
Milnerls fervent belief in the efficacy of administration was not the only 
policy which found sustenance in the ideology of efficiency. His rqyriad policies on 
emigration, afforestation, land settlement, etc., also had their tap-root in 
efficiency, though the broader interests of the mining industry were never far from 
the surface. 
Milner hoped that increased emigration to South Africa woad numerically 
swamp the Boer element, thus ensuring continued British political supremacy. He 
predicted confidently that, within some five years of the end of the war, the British 
population would be more than doubled. In other words, what he required was nothing 
less than a large-scale exercise h social engineering; again, the mechanism he 
counted upon was Ifthe certainty of a vast and immediate expansion of mining and of 
other en%erprises after the war which would enable the economy to support a vastly 
increased population of British worhenl'. (83) Unfortunately., this economic expansion 
never materialized. 
As he regarded emigration primarily as an arithmetical exercise at the best 
of times, Milner failed to conceive of the possibility of a split anong the British 
population along class lines on such issues as Chinese labour. This, however, did 
not prevent him from taking a very keen interest in emisation, and in Narch 1903 he 
noted with satisfaction that during the first three months of that year South Africa, 
with 11,616 emigrants, was the third most popular immigrant country after the USA and 
Canada. (84) 
Wgration and m i r e  went together; "if the British population did not 
increase fast enough to fill the empty spaces of the empire, others wouldq\ (85) In 
other words, emigration would not only swamp the Boer element but also keep potential 
competitors at bay and. help to incorporate the country more firmly into the British 
economic orbit. Unfortunately, although the national press abounded with articles on 
"population is powern and the "future of the %pire and countryff, which depended upon 
a numerically large population, the birth rate had been declining and infant mortality 
had been rising in Britain ever since the 1870s. (86) 
Not only the future of the empire but of the British race was threatened 
by these particular trends. Here again, a programme based on national efficiency was 
needed, for 
what is the use of Empire if it does not breed and 
maintain in the truest and fullest sense of the word 
an Imperial race? What is the use of talking about 
Empire if here, at its very centre, there is alwaps 
to be found a mass of people, stunted in education, 
a prey to intemperance, huddled and congested beyond 
the possibility of realizing in my true sense either 
social or domestic life? (87) 
These sentiments readily found. their response in Milner. He had been involved in 
social reform, however peripherally, since his early days as a lecturer on Socialism - 
"there is nothing terrible or urnranted in itw (88) - in mitechapel. Nilner 
eventually rejected socialism and believed that the evils of contemporary society 
could best be mitigated by efficient administration. He admired Bismasckian Germany, 
where administration and planning provided workers with houses, welfare and pensions. 
(891 
. . 
In 1904, one of the efficiency ideologues, T. C. Horsfall, even wrote a 
popular publication on Germany's superior town planning, entitled The hprovement of 
the Dwellings and Surroundings of the People: the example of G e m y .  One of his 
other publications, The Relation of National Service to the Welfare of the CommuniQ, 
was carefully annotated by MiSner in 1904 for "improved , . . imperial government, to 
put an end to the slums, the existence of which ruins the pwsique of vast numbers of 
our people . . ." . (90) 
In fact, Milner's concern with National Service and emigration was 
enthusiastically shared by a number of South African minire magnates and their cohorts. 
C. S. Goldman, a director of several mining corepanies of the -10-French Farrar Group, l 
and Henry Birchenough, Board of Trade Commissioner and director of the British South l 
l 
I Africa Compmy, were on the National Service Leaguets Executive Committee. (91) In 
I 1905 Goldman, in conjunction with such representatives of the Milner-mining industry 1 
axis as Lionel Phillips, Owen Thomas and J. L. Garvin, among others, 
published a remarkable volume entitled The Empire and the C~nimxvp which explicitly 
revealed at both an ideological asld a practical level the extent of social engineering 
I mining capital and Milner were prepared to indulge in during the so-called 
reconstruction of the Transvaal. Women's and workers9 emigration, land settlement, 
i 
closer -10-Transvaal trade, municipalization, etc., were all to be encouraged and 
supported by both government and "interested parties". Indeed, considering the true 
extent of mining capital's involvement in the emigration and land settlement schemes, 
the argwnent that at least some mining interests regarded Milner's social engineering 
as a uid ro uo for "the great losses incurred by the industry during and after the 
w a r  .*ears to be a reasonably valid one. 
In 1903 Chamberlain informed Milner that women's emigration was now 
government-aided and supervised by a specially appointed Government Secretary who, in 
turn, liaised with the South African Expansion Committee (sAIX). In fact, by January 
1903, the SAEC (in mid-1903 it became the South African Colonisation Society [SACS]) 
was apparently sending out some 100 women a month to South Africa. (9) The London 
committee of the SAEC numbered amongst others as its members a s  C. S. Goldman and 
&S Lionel Phillips, while the Johannesburg advisory council included Sir Percy 
Fitzpatrick, Mrs Drummond Chaplin and Mrs Sidney Jennings. (94) The SAEC9s 
Johannesburg Secretary, Ess Russell, frequently called upon Milner to discuss and 
iron out any doreseen problems in the otherwise relatively smooth but limited flow 
of women emigrants to the Rand. (95) 
The activities of the SAM: were indirectly financed by Fhodes and Rothschild; 
the mining industry had quickly realized that the emigration of women, both as 
domestics and as wage-earners, would not only ease the demand for domestic labour and 
push out the Africanflhouse-boys"into the mining labour pool but would also help to 
stabilize the transient White labour force. (96) The mining industry's close 
involvement with emigration was apparent as late as 1906! when Lionel Phillips 
informed Selborne that Wernhor Beit would no longer financially assist the emigration 
of British labourers to the Rand un-til the political climate had become more 
conducive to the industry! S interests. (97) 
In 1900-1 both Rhodes and Abe Bailey were prepaxed actively to support 
Nilnerrs land settlement schemes, which had been the subject of a Lands Settlement 
Commission. (98) The mining industry evidently felt that British settlers in the 
countryside would help to increase the so-called "British element1". At the same 
time it was assumed that the settlers would farm intensively, thus providing at Least 
some of the foodstuffs for the Rand market, while paying sent for the extensive 
landholdings of the mining companies. (99) In spite of extensive propaganda both in 
England and the Transvaal, land settlement was a manifest failme. (100) PIilner~ S 
land settlement organizer, Owen Thomas, in a fit of hyperbole, even remarked that 
llmigration from one part of the Eknpire to another should involve no greater uprooting, 
no further loss of English sentiment to a colonist than the transference of residence 
from London to a village in Hertfordshire . . .l1. (101) Potential settlers were 
evidently unimpressed, for by 1906 there were still only 517 in the Transvaal, (102) 
i 
In fact, much of the government-owned land. which was actually allocated to l 
the se-btlers was agriculturally useless; moreover, the wages on the B a d  mines were I 
far more attractive than the anticipated returns on isolated farms in the veld. As 
with the majority of Milnerls schemes, land settlement suffered from acute shortages l 
of funds almost from its inception - "the plain fast is that the Thirty-Five Million 
Loan is insufficient to do what it was intended to do . . .l1. (103) 
Both Milner and the mining industs~r had noted that much of the wood needed 
for railway sleepers and. supports in the mime-shafts had often to be imported from l 
abroad (104), a d  accordingly, in 1904, the Department of Agriculture recommended l I 
the planting of vast forests as the railways alons qlreqy.ire 30,000 sleepers 
yearly . . .'I. (105) By this time, however, the Chamber of fines was evidently too I 
involved in the Chinese labour issue, which in any case would result in a more 
substantial reduction in operating costs than a more effective supply of tinber. l 
This left Milner musing about afforestation in the sure knowledge that, had it I 
succeeded, he would have "done somethiq of real nomentun when one" paltry efforts 
and skxqggles are forgotten . . . If. (106) 
i 
Milnerls activities in the Transvaal had, however, been far from "paltryf1. 
His intimate liaison with mining capital in its attempts to control the labour supply 
and restructure its modes of production now that access to large amounts of cash was 
rather restricted, set the pace for the further development of state-capital relations 
via the 1907 strikes to the Rand revolt and beyond. At the same the his overall 
desire to co-operate with capital, which in any case has only selectively been touched 
upon in this paper, was not total in that at all times throughout his sojourn in South 
Africa Milner kept in close touch with British political and economic developaents. 
He shared with Chamberlain a reasonably clear perception of the'crisis of Bpitish 
productive capital; indeed, he was probably, as a former Secretary to Goschen, aware 
of the severe shortage of gold bullion in the Bank of England prior to 1902, and the 
impact that this had upon the Discount rate and domestic capital fornation. (107) To 
a certain extent he also shared with Chamberlain, who, in 1899, called for "an 
alliance between the Teutonic race and the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon 
Race . . .lq (108), the belief that the British race was enfeebled and that vigorous 
administration was the key answer to this problem and a whole gamut of related issues, 
from eugenics to falling birth rates and emigration. 
As such, even though a certain amount of what he had set out to achieve in 
1900 never fully materialized, his enthusiasm for administrative reorganizatiorq ,for 
covering the hills of the veld with tree plantations, or, more importantly, for 
promoting British economic interests on the Rand, 'we'e ,  to a certain extent, 
reflections of both an ideological and an economic crisis in Britain. 
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